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FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. v.
UNITED STATES: TIPPING THE SCALES
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS AT THE PUBLIC'S EXPENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States' the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held that the denial of a federal wet-
lands permit under section 1344 of the Clean Water Act' may
constitute a compensable taking of private property under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 The court re-
manded the case to the Federal Court of Claims to determine the
value of the property remaining after the permit denial, while warn-
ing the trial court that the existing record did not support a finding
of the loss of all economically viable use of the property.4 The Fed-
eral Circuit declared that the parcel's retention of economic value
would not foreclose the finding of a compensable "partial taking. ' 5
Yet the court did not set a "bright line" standard to guide the lower
court in determining whether the percentage of remaining value
would be sufficient to rebut the takings challenge. Instead, the court
ordered "a classic exercise of judicial balancing of competing
values." 6
While the finding of a "partial taking" would be new to takings
jurisprudence, the utilization of a balancing test is not new.7 The
Supreme Court attempts to apply a categorical "all-or-nothing" rule
in regulatory takings cases.8 For cases not falling within this rule,
the Court purports to use a balancing test to determine whether
1. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
3. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1568. The Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part that private property
shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend.
V. This part of the Fifth Amendment is commonly known as the "Takings Clause."
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1887), the
Supreme Court made the Takings Clause applicable to the states by incorporating
the Fifth Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 5A.03,
at 138 n.23 (1988).
4. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1572-73.
5. Id. at 1570 (citing Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990))
("Nothing in the Fifth Amendment limits its protection to only 'categorical' regula-
tory takings, nor has the Supreme Court or this court so held.").
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978): Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
8. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992)
(holding that a categorical, compensable taking occurs where governmental regula-
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compensation is due. The Court, however, has yet to apply the bal-
ancing test to a specific situation and find a compensable partial tak-
ing. The Court's reluctance to address directly the partial takings
issue has caused property rights activists to lobby Congress and state
legislatures for serious, albeit extreme, takings legislation. Likewise
it has caused lower courts such as the Federal Circuit in Florida
Rock to reformulate and expand takings doctrine.9
This Note discusses why the Federal Circuit embraced the concept
of a partial taking. It contends that the Circuit's action was a reac-
tion not only to the fervor created by conservative politicians, busi-
nesses, and property rights groups who advocate radical takings
reform but also to the Supreme Court's approach to regulatory tak-
ings cases. This Note maintains that the Court's limited use of the
balancing test has denied compensation to deserving property own-
ers and has caused lower courts and legislatures to overreact to the
perceived unfairness. This Note also suggests that Congress and
state legislatures should enter the takings arena and clarify regula-
tory takings law. A legislatively-mandated approach would provide
guidance to the judiciary and would prevent questionable decisions
such as that in Florida Rock. Yet in reformulating takings law, legis-
lative bodies must consider why the Supreme Court has followed
the careful approach that it has in deciding regulatory takings cases.
If legislatures enact statutes tipping the scales too far in favor of
property owners, decades of environmental and land use statutes
and regulations will be jeopardized as will the health, safety, and
public welfare goals those regulations were passed to protect.
II. BACKGROUND: SUPREME COURT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
United States Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has been crit-
icized as "a vast sea of uncertainty,"'" "almost totally out of
touch,"'" "confusing,"'12 and "vague."' 3 Norman Williams, a leading
commentator in land use law, attributes this to the Court's inexperi-
tion denies a property owner all economically beneficial or productive use of his
land).
9. See eg., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale. 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. C1. App. 1985).
aff'd in par4 vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded on other grounds. 720
P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986). In Corrigan an intermediate appellate state court held that a
compensable taking occurred where a zoning ordinance precluded development of
80% of the owner's land, 3836 of 4800 acres. Id. at 532. 540. Rather than asking
whether the local ordinance forbid all economically viable use of the entire 4800-
acre parcel, as is customary in regulatory takings cases, the court inquired whether
the regulation prevented all economically viable use of the 3836 acres affected by
the regulation. AL at 538-39. The court answered in the affirmative and ordered the
City to compensate the landowner. Id at 539-40.
10. WILIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.01, at 132.





ence with takings issues and its refusal to consider a vast number of
potentially enlightening state court decisions. 4 The Supreme Court
first addressed the interplay between land use regulation and the
Takings Clause in the 1920s when it upheld the constitutionality of
zoning as a valid exercise of governmental authority'5 notwithstand-
ing the adverse effect of the regulation on the value of the restricted
property. 6 The Court decided several other land use cases in the
1920s and then left the field for over forty years.17 By the time it
reentered, state courts had developed a varied, but fairly predict-
able, approach to takings challenges. 8 The Court, however, ignored
existing lower court case law and formulated two categorical rules' 9
and an ambiguous balancing test2" that favor governmental regula-
tion over private property rights.
There are two kinds of takings under the Fifth Amendment:
physical invasion and regulatory. In physical invasion cases the gov-
ernment appropriates or occupies private property. In regulatory
cases the government implements regulations that restrict the use
and affect the value of land. Physical invasion cases have created
fewer stumbling blocks for the Court than have regulatory cases.
According to Williams, "It has always been clear that, if a govern-
mental agency physically invades and takes over a tract of land (in
whole or in part), . . . compensation must be paid to the property
owner."'" The Court follows this categorical rule when the govern-
14. Id. at 169. The Court's desire to decide takings cases without the benefit of
state court precedent seems to have ended with Dolan v. City of Tigard. 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994). In Dolan the Court examined the approaches taken by several states in
determining the necessary relationship between the potential impacts of a proposed
development and the conditions imposed to address those impacts. Id. at 2318-19.
15. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). Although the prop-
erty owner in Euclid requested injunctive relief under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case is often cited as standing
for the proposition that government can restrict the use of land without paying com-
pensation, a remedy required by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.01, at 126.
16. The landowner in Euclid argued that the ordinance reduced the value of its
property by 75%. Euclid.v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 384.
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.01, at 127.
18. Id. at 127-28.
19. See supra note 8 and infra note 22 and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
21. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.03, at 138. The history of physical invasion
cases began in 1871 with Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S.
166 (1871). Id. at 138 n.23. In Pumpelly the State of Wisconsin flooded 640 acres of
private property while erecting a dam. The Court held that "where real estate is
actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material,
... so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking .. " Pumpelly
v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 181.
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ment physically appropriates private property.22 Thus landowners
are compensated even if the physical invasion is de minimis.23 Fifth
Amendment challenges to regulatory actions, on the other hand,
are, with one exception,24 not decided by a categorical rule but by
an ad hoc, fact-specific inquiry' that attempts to balance competing
interests.
In 1922 the Court stated the basic guiding principle for regulatory
takings cases: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.- 26
Although this oft-cited statement has great rhetorical value, it offers
little guidance to landowners, regulatory bodies, or courts. Since the
1960s the Court has enunciated at least three variations of a balanc-
ing test to help it determine when a regulation goes "too far."27
First, a regulatory taking occurs if an ordinance "does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests... or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land .... I"8 Second, while there is no
"set formula" for determining whether a regulation effects a taking,
there are "several factors that have particular significance ...
[These factors include] [t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant .... the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations... [and] the character
of the governmental action."2 9 Finally,
where the government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the
owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the
22. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978)
("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government .... ).
23. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(holding that New York law requiring landlord to permit installation of cable on
rental property constitutes compensable taking).
24. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992)
(holding that a categorical, compensable taking occurs where governmental regula-
tion denies a property owner a/! economically beneficial or productive use of his
land).
25. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124 ("[This
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated .... [1It depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case.' ") (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958)).
26. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) (emphasis added).
27. 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 52A.04[l][b], at
52A-53 (1994).
28. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citations omitted).
29. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
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regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear
a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.30
Although the enunciation of a test is offered to provide clarity in
judicial decision-making, the factors included in the balancing test
are often ambiguous and difficult to define. For example, the Court
has clarified only partially the notion that an owner cannot be de-
nied "economically viable use of his land." In Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal CounciP' the Supreme Court held that a categorical,
compensable taking occurs where governmental regulation denies a
property owner "all economically beneficial or productive use of his
land."32 Thus if the "economically viable use" factor is seen as a
spectrum from zero to one hundred percent diminution in value, the
Court in Lucas focused on one extreme end of that spectrum; it an-
nounced an unambiguous rule that applies where regulation dimin-
ishes the value of private property by one hundred percent.
The Court however has not addressed sufficiently the remainder
of the spectrum: must government deny a landowner all economi-
cally viable use of his land before it is required to compensate the
owner for his loss? The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that
"mere diminution in value" is not sufficient to constitute a taking.33
Yet is there a point between complete deprivation of all economi-
cally viable use and mere diminution in value that justifies compen-
sation? The Court has not answered this question in a holding,
although the majority in Lucas responded in dicta affirmatively.34
The majority criticized dissenting Justice Stevens, who described the
categorical Lucas rule as "wholly arbitrary [in that a] landowner
whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while
an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's
full value."35 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded that
the analysis of Justice Stevens
30. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992).
31. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
32. Id. at 2893 (emphasis added). The plaintiff in Lucas purchased two lots on a
barrier island in South Carolina with the intention of erecting single-family resi-
dences on the parcels, as the owners of adjacent property had already done. Id. at
2889. Several years later the state legislature passed the Beachfront Management
Act, which prohibited construction of habitable improvements in an area encom-
passing Lucas's two lots. Id. Lucas filed suit and the state trial court found that the
Act "deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots .... eliminated the
unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them valueless." Id. at 2890 (quoting App.
to Pet. for Cert. 37). The trial court awarded $1,232,387.50 in "just compensation"
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed,
holding that no taking had occurred because the regulation was enacted "to prevent
serious public harm." Ia
33. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 131.
34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
35. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is
one step short of complete is not entitled to compensation.
Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our
categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time
and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and... the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed ex ectations" are
keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.9
The majority dicta in Lucas did not draw a "bright line" indicating
the percentage of devaluation, less than one hundred percent, that is
sufficient to constitute a taking. It did, however, acknowledge that
in some circumstances a landowner may recover under the Fifth
Amendment even if governmental action has not destroyed com-
pletely all economic viability of the property. The Court thus has
left the door open to legislatures and lower courts regarding the re-
mainder of the takings spectrum.37 It is this part of the spectrum,
the partial takings issue, that the Court of Appeals attempts to ad-
dress in Florida Rock.
In confronting the question of partial takings, the court in Florida
Rock must examine another ambiguous concept in the balancing
equation: "investment-backed expectations."'3 Exactly what this
phrase means is unclear. There is no consensus in state law on this
issue, and the area is one of "almost pure gut jurisprudence."39 Wil-
liams focuses on reliance in explaining investment-backed expecta-
tions; one must examine the extent to which a developer has acted
in deciding whether a regulation infringes upon the developer's ex-
pectations.' Other commentators note that the Court has intro-
duced "profit" into the investment-backed expectations inquiry, an
36. Id. at 2895 n.8.
37. See Charles R. Wise & Kirk Emerson, Regulatory Takings: The Emerging
Doctrine and Its Implications for Public Administration, Nov., 1994. available in
LEXIS, News Library, Current News File ("The Supreme Court has declared itself
only with respect to total economic viability. Continued silence on the issue of im-
pact on economic viability that is less than total is unlikely to prove satisfactory to
regulators, property owners, or the lower courts as a guide to action.").
38. The Court first began to include investment-backed expectations as part of its
balancing test in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Penn-
sylvania Coal "is the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that sub-
stantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-
backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.'" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). In Pennsylvania Coal the defendant sold the
surface rights of its property to the plaintiff while retaining the right to remove all
coal beneath the surface. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. The
state then enacted the Kohler Act, which forbid the mining of "coal in such a way as
to cause subsidence of... any structure used as a human habitation .... " Id. at 412-
13. The Court held that the Kohler Act, as applied to the defendant, constituted a
taking under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 414-15.




action that only "add[s] confusion to the issue. '41 There is general
consensus that a property owner is not entitled to the most profita-
ble use, otherwise known as the "highest and best" use, of his land.42
There is also general consensus that a landowner has a constitu-
tional right to receive a "reasonable return"43 from his property.4
Yet judicial precedent is not clear as to what constitutes a reason-
able return, and this ambiguity adds confusion to the role that in-
vestment-backed expectations play in regulatory takings cases.
In deciding whether a regulation effects a taking, the Court also
considers the segmentation of property interests or rights and the
segmentation of parcels. The Court has instructed that one must
examine the impact of the regulation on the complete "bundle of
sticks" and not the impact of the regulation on one particular
"stick." In addition, one should not divide the parcel and focus only
on the portion affected by the regulation, but rather one must con-
sider the regulatory impact on the entire parcel. In 1978 the Court
stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In decid-
ing whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
45rights in the parcel as a whole ....
41. Wise & Emerson, supra note 37. The Court demonstrated the relevance of
profit to investment-backed expectations in Pennsylvania Coal. In holding that leg-
islation precluding the mining of coal constituted a compensable taking of the de-
fendant's property, the Court explained that "[w]hat makes the right to mine coal
valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impractica-
ble to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at
414-15.
42. Wise & Emerson, supra note 37.
43. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.12, at 156.
44. Id.
45. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). In
Penn Central the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission rejected the
property owner's alternative proposals to construct a fifty-five or a fifty-three story
office building over Grand Central Station. laL at 117. The property owner argued
that it had established a taking "by showing that [it had] been denied the ability to
exploit a property interest that [it] heretofore had believed was available for devel-
opment .... " Id. at 130. The Court denied that the property interest in question,
the right to develop the air rights above Grand Central Station, was "so bound up
with the investment-backed expectations of [the property owner] that governmental
deprivation of these rights invariably-Le., irrespective of the impact of the restric-
tion on the value of the parcel as a whole-constitutes a 'taking.'" Id. at 130 n.27.
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Yet in 1992 the Court in dicta hesitated to reinforce this long-stand-
ing rule' and consequently added ambiguity to a once clearly de-
fined factor in the balancing test.
As part of the balancing test the Court also considers whether
there is an "average reciprocity of benefits."47 "Under this notion a
land use restriction is valid only when (and because) each person
restricted derives some benefit from the fact that others in the vicin-
ity are similarly restricted."' According to Williams, this test was
rejected in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York
City49 "since recognizing a landmark really doesn't help everyone
else much."'50 Whether the test was rejected in Penn Central or not,
the difficulty in defining a "benefit" certainly was recognized in Lu-
cas.51 Thus "[w]here all this stands now is anybody's guess." 5
The variations of the balancing test have been described as
"hollow rhetoric" 53 because "[t]here is... enough ambiguity in the
case law so that members of the Court [are] able to choose appro-
priate language to support either side in almost any case .... I
This ambiguity, however, can also be regarded as affording great
flexibility to courts in deciding regulatory takings cases. Flexibility
allows courts to implement what may be termed a "fairness" princi-
ple: "The determination that governmental action constitutes a tak-
ing is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state
power in the public interest.
55
46. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 n.7.(1992).
The court observed:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be mea-
sured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90%
of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze
the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economi-
cally beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Id
47. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.10, at 152.
48. ILL
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.10, at 153.
51. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2897 (1992) (-[Tjhe
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder.").
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.10, at 153.
53. ROHAN, supra note 27, § 52A.04[1], at 52A-56.
54. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.17, at 169.
55. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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III. THE SUBJECT CASE: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND OF FLORIDA ROCK
In 1972 Florida Rock Industries, Inc., a company that mines,
processes, and sells crushed stone, purchased 1560 acres of wetlands
in Dade County, Florida, for $2,964,000, or approximately $1900 per
acre.5 6 Florida Rock purchased the property intending to mine the
limestone that lay beneath the surface.17 Shortly thereafter the fed-
eral government enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act.58 Five years later the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) implemented regulations pursuant to section 1344 of the
Clean Water Act, requiring property owners to obtain permits
before discharging dredged or fill material into "navigable waters,"
including wetlands.5 9 Unaware of the need to obtain a permit, Flor-
ida Rock began mining without acquiring the requisite approval.
The Corps issued a cease and desist order, forcing Florida Rock to
stop its mining operations. Florida Rock then sought a permit for
the entire 1560-acre parcel. The Corps responded that it would con-
sider issuing a permit for only ninety-eight acres, a parcel of suffi-
cient size to enable three years of excavation. It later denied the
permit because the mining would cause "irremediable loss of an
ecologically valuable wetland parcel and would create undesirable
water turbidity., 60  Florida Rock responded by filing suit in the
United States Court of Federal Claims,61 alleging that the denial of
the permit constituted an uncompensated taking under the Fifth
Amendment.
56. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
57. Il
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988).
59. Section 1344 of the Clean Water Act states that the Secretary of the United
States Army may issue permits through the Army Corps of Engineers "for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal sites."
33 U.S.C. § 1344.
60. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1563.
61. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, Florida Rock could have chal-
lenged: 1) the refusal of the Corps to consider the permit application for the 1560-
acre parcel and 2) the denial of the permit application for the 98-acre parcel. Flor-
ida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1563 n.5 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1988)). Instead, pursuant to the Tucker Act, Florida Rock filed a complaint in the
Court of Federal Claims, which handles all takings claims against the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. V 1993). By not pursuing a remedy under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, Florida Rock implicitly conceded that the Corps had authority
to act with respect to the parcel. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d
893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). It therefore was es-
topped from arguing this issue in later Tucker Act proceedings. Id.
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In Florida Rock 162 the Court of Federal Claims held that the
permit denial constituted a regulatory taking63 and awarded Florida
Rock $1,029,000 plus attorney fees and simple interest.' The court
found that mining was the only viable economic use for the parcel.65
In prohibiting such activity the Corps effectively had reduced the
value of the property from $10,500 per acre66 to a negligible
amount, thus requiring compensation under United States Supreme
Court precedent.67
The Government appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.' In Florida Rock 1169 the Federal Circuit
held that the trial court should not have focused on the immediate
use of the property in determining the value of the parcel after the
denial of the wetlands permit.71 Instead the court should have es-
tablished the "fair market value" of the property after the denial so
that it could compare that figure to the fair market value of the
property prior to the restriction.71 The court vacated in part the
trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.'
62. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985). aff'd in part.
vacated in part, and remanded, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986). cert. denied. 479 U.S.
1053 (1987).
63. Id. at 179.
64. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (No. 91-5156).
65. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164.
66. Brief for Appellant at 15, (No. 91-5156).
67. Although the case was decided seven years prior to Lucas, the court found
support for its holding in other Supreme Court decisions. The Court of Claims ob-
served, "A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if
it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land .... '" Florida Rock Indus..
Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. at 165 ((quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-96 (1981)) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon.
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
68. Decisions of the Court of Federal Claims are appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. V 1993).
69. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
70. Id. at 902, 905.
71. Id. at 903, 905. The fair market value of a parcel is determined by examining
offers that have been made for the property as well as offers that have been made
for similarly situated property in the vicinity of the particular parcel. Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 169 (1990), vacated and remanded. 18
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. CL 898 (1995).
72. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d at 906. The Federal Cir-
cuit instructed the Court of Claims that when determining the post-regulation fair
market value of the parcel on remand, it may consider "a relevant market made up
of investors who are real but are speculating in whole or major part." Id. at 903. In
passing, the appellate court noted that "the 'willing buyer' of the [fair] market value
formula has got to be one who is correctly informed about the physical character of
the land, as well as legal restrictions on its use." Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
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In Florida Rock III17 the Court of Claims once again held that the
action of the Corps constituted a regulatory taking.74 The court
awarded Florida Rock $1,029,000, or $10,500 per acre, the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the time of the taking.75 To determine
the damage award, the court heard evidence offered by both parties
regarding the fair market value of the parcel after the permit denial.
The Government's expert assessed the post-taking value at $4000
per acre," $2100 more than Florida Rock had originally paid for the
land.77 He contended that the highest and best use of the property
was investment and that there was a market for the property among
knowledgeable investors.7" Florida Rock's assessor argued that the
highest and best use of the property was as a recreation site and that
there was no market for the parcel among knowledgeable inves-
tors.79 He assessed the post-taking value of the property at $500 per
acre.
8 0
The court accepted the opinion of Florida Rock's expert, noting
that the decline in fair market value from $10,500 to $500 per acre
constituted a "substantial reduction in value."'" Yet the court also
73. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Il (citing Yuba Natural Resources v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577. 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). Rather than awarding the difference between the fair market
value of the property prior to or at the time of the taking, $10,500 per acre, and the
fair market value after the taking, $500 per acre, the court simply awarded $10,500
per acre. Id. The court explained, "Although the property retains a residual value
of $500 per acre, payment of the full fair market value at the time of taking effectu-
ates the purpose of an action in inverse condemnation, which is to produce a result
comparable to the one that would have been reached had the government directly
condemned the property." Id. The court also awarded $808,785 to Florida Rock in
attorney fees and costs as well as compound interest on the $1,029,000 damage
award. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 266-82L, at 5, 6 (Cl. Ct. July
31, 1991) (order awarding attorney fees, costs, and compound interest).
76. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. at 172.
77. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
78. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. at 172. In making this
determination the Government's expert used the standard comparable sales valua-
tion method, a method that assesses the value of a parcel based upon the amounts
paid by other property owners for land in the vicinity of the parcel in question. Id.
at 169.
79. Id. at 172. As proof Florida Rock offered a survey indicating that landowners
who had purchased property near Florida Rock's parcel were not sufficiently knowl-
edgeable of the federal regulations restricting the development of those parcels.
Florida Rock argued that these property owners would not have paid an average of
$6100 per acre for the restricted land if they had known about the federal regula-
tions. The post-taking fair market value of Florida Rock's parcel therefore could
not be determined using a comparable sales formula because no comparable sales
existed. Id.
80. IcL
81. Id. at 175. The court rejected the opinion of the Government's expert be-
cause it was "convinced that the legal requirement that any investment market be
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observed that this ninety-five percent reduction "in and of itself is
not a sufficient basis for concluding that a taking has occurred.""?
The court then stated it also must inquire into "[tihe owner's oppor-
tunity to recoup its investment"' to determine whether compensa-
tion was required.' 4 It observed that Florida Rock had purchased
the property for mining purposes and that the property owner could
recoup its investment only by engaging in this activity.° The regula-
tion thus resulted in a substantial impact on Florida Rock's invest-
ment. 6 The court concluded that a taking had occurred g7 and the
Government appealed for a second time to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
On appeal the Government argued that the denial of the permit
did not create a sufficiently detrimental impact on the value of Flor-
ida Rock's property to require compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.' It contended that the Court of Claims, in determin-
ing the fair market value of the parcel after the permit denial, im-
properly disregarded the actual market in which properties similar
to that of Florida Rock had been purchased and sold for substantial
values.' The Government also argued that the court erred in con-
cluding that comparable land sales in the vicinity were irrelevant
because the purchasers lacked knowledge of applicable governmen-
tal restrictions. 0 It asserted that the concept of "knowledgeable
buyers and sellers" is used in fair market value analysis because it is
presumed to indicate actual market conditions9' and that the actual
among investors with knowledge of the restrictions on the land ha[d] not been met."
Id
82. Id (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104. 131
(1978)).
83. Id at 176. In stating that it should consider "It]he owner's opportunity to
recoup its investment," the court acknowledged the relevance of -investment-
backed expectations" to its regulatory takings analysis. Id.
84. Id The Supreme Court decided Lucas in 1992, two years after the Court of
Claims decided Florida Rock III. If Lucas had preceded Florida Rock III. the court
could have held that the 95% reduction in value constituted a compensable taking in
and of itself because the permit denial essentially forced Florida Rock "to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses" of its property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2895 (1992). The categorical Lucas rule would have elimi-
nated the need for further inquiry into Florida Rock's opportunity to recoup its
investment.
85. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. CL at 176 ("[Tjhere is no
dispute that [Florida Rock] purchased the property for the sole purpose of limestone
mining;, there is virtually no other business by which [Florida Rock] could 'recoup its
investment or better, subject to the regulation.' ").
86. Id
87. Id
88. Brief for Appellant at 29, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (No. 91-5156).
89. Id at 37-38.
90. Id
91. Id at 34 n.13.
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market should not be disregarded simply because it consists of
"unknowledgeable" buyers and sellers. 2 "As long as there is an ac-
tual market for land .. . in which properties are being bought and
sold at substantial prices, lands located within that market area have
substantial economic values."'93 The Government further contended
that the court "was not entitled to substitute its own concepts of
economic wisdom and prudent investment for those of the actual
marketplace. 94 Notwithstanding the permit denial, Florida Rock's
parcel retained economic value because it could be sold on the ac-
tual market at a substantial price.95 Thus the action of the Corps did
not constitute a compensable taking.96
Florida Rock responded that the Federal Circuit in Florida Rock
II had instructed the Court of Claims on remand to determine
whether an actual market existed among purchasers with knowledge
of the governmental restrictions affecting the land.97 After hearing
expert testimony from both sides, the Court of Claims in Florida
Rock III rejected the Government's assessment of the post-taking
fair market value because it was not based upon the actions of in-
formed buyers.98 Florida Rock argued that the trial court's finding
was made pursuant to the instructions of the Federal Circuit and
that the Government's contention that unknowledgeable buyers
may be considered in determining post-taking value was contrary to
the appellate court's instructions."9
In Florida Rock IV" °° the appellate court rejected the trial court's
fair market value analysis that led to its finding that the Govern-
ment's regulatory action denied Florida Rock essentially all eco-
92. Id. at 35.
93. Id. The conclusion that Florida Rock's property retained economic value is
derived not only from the fact that similarly restricted parcels in its vicinity had been
bought and sold for substantial values but also from the fact that Florida Rock actu-
ally received an offer to purchase the property, despite the permit denial. In Florida
Rock III the company's President testified at trial that he had received a $3.5 million
offer for the parcel in June of 1981. Id. at 12 n.5. He further testified that he be-
lieved the land to be worth in excess of $10,000 per acre at that time. Id.
94. Id. at 37. Just as the court is not entitled to substitute its own economic wis-
dom for that of the actual marketplace, neither is Florida Rock. "While Florida
Rock might have been reluctant to sell wetlands to willing, but 'unknowledgeable,'
purchasers in order to protect those prospective buyers from their own supposed
folly, the cost of such rectitude is not billable to the United States under the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 36.
95. Id. at 35. See supra note 93.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Brief for Appellee at 14, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (No. 91-5156).
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id.
100. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
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nomically viable use of its property.10' Although the Federal Circuit
in Florida Rock 11 had instructed the Court of Claims on remand to
examine comparable sales made by "correctly informed" buyers,"0 '
it did not intend the detailed examination into the "motivation and
sophistication" of such buyers that Florida Rock had pursued.11 3
The trial court erred by disregarding the property value assessment
offered by the Government °'4 and accepting the testimony of Flor-
ida Rock's expert, which "rejected all of the comparable sales values
on the principle that none of the purchasers were sufficiently sophis-
ticated and knowledgeable."' 5 Thus the trial court's conclusion
that the action of the Corps reduced the value of the property by
ninety-five percent was based upon the incorrect premise that the
property had a post-regulation value of $500 per acre.
While expressing its support of the Government's assessment,'0U
the Federal Circuit at the same time refused to hold that the assess-
ment was correct. It remanded the case again for a recalculation of
the fair market value and a determination of whether the diminu-
tion in value was sufficient to constitute a taking.' 7 The court also
refused to instruct the trial court that Florida Rock would not be
entitled to compensation if the post-regulation value of the property
is $4000 per acre. The Federal Circuit told the Court of Claims that
once the trial court determines the post-regulation fair market value
of the property, it then must decide the takings issue. The Court of
Claims should resolve this issue by examining the change in fair
market value caused by the regulation and the landowner's opportu-
nity to recoup its investment.10 8 The appellate court instructed the
trial court that, should the property be found to have retained some
101. Id. at 1565-66.
102. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). See also supra note 72.
103. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1567.
104. The Federal Circuit emphasized that the trial court in Florida Rock III had
disregarded the appellate court's approval of the assessment offered by the Govern-
ment's expert, an approval expressed in Florida Rock I. In Florida Rock l1 the
Federal Circuit had stated, "We are of the opinion that [the Government expert's]
testimony, if considered and believed, established the existence of a market in which
Florida Rock could have disposed of the property and mitigated the severity of the
regulatory action here involved, and the [trial] court should have considered such a
possibility.- Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d at 903.
105. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1566. The Federal
Circuit emphatically rejected the analysis of Florida Rock's expert and the trial
court's reliance thereon, and held: "That was error--contrary to our instruction in
Florida Rock II, contrary to generally accepted understandings of market valuation.
and finally, contrary to the working assumption of a free market." Id.
106. See supra note 104.
107. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1567.
108. Id. This is the same instruction that the Federal Circuit gave to the Court of
Claims in Florida Rock IL Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893,
905 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
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value, the court must ask two questions: first, "whether a regulation
must destroy a certain proportion of a property's economic use or
value in order for a compensable taking of property to occur,"'10 9
and second, "what that proportion is.""'  The Federal Circuit an-
swered its first question by announcing that "[n]othing in the Fifth
Amendment limits its protection to only 'categorical' regulatory tak-
ings, nor has the Supreme Court or this court so held.""' The ap-
pellate court did not, however, answer the second question and
determine for the trial court what residual fair market value would
be sufficient to overcome Florida Rock's takings challenge. Thus
the trial court must determine on remand whether a sixty percent
diminution in value is sufficient to constitute a taking.
The Federal Circuit observed that there is "little direct case law
guidance""' 2 on "when a partial loss of economic use of the prop-
erty has crossed the line from a noncompensable 'mere diminution'
to a compensable 'partial taking.' """ The appellate court proposed
that the trial court balance competing values) 4 It explained that
the balancing analysis should consider whether the Government ac-
ted fairly and reasonably in regulating the property, whether direct
benefits accrue to the property or are shared widely while costs are
focused on only a few, and whether economically realistic, alterna-
tive activities are allowed on the property.1 5 As this Note goes to
print the Court of Claims has not resolved whether the post-taking
fair market value of Florida Rock's property is $4000 per acre. It
also has not resolved whether the denial of the wetlands permit con-
stitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.
IV. DIScusSIoN
A. The Florida Rock IV Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit could have in-
structed the Court of Claims in Florida Rock IV" 6 that if the denial
of the federal wetlands permit diminished Florida Rock's property
by sixty percent, from $10,500 to $4000, then Florida Rock is not
entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The court
could have explained such a holding by noting that, despite the sixty
percent decline, Florida Rock would still receive a return of over
109. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1568.
110. Id.




115. Id. at 1571.
116. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
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one hundred percent on its investment.' 17 Instead the appellate
court observed that if the fair market value of the parcel after the
permit denial is $4000 per acre, "the correct outcome [regarding the
takings issue] is no longer clear." '18 The Federal Circuit thus
opened the door to a possible finding of the Court of Claims that a
diminution of sixty percent constitutes a compensable partial taking.
The appellate court justified its action by declaring that there is little
difference between a taking by physical invasion and one by govern-
mental regulation and that both require compensation.'t 9 This dec-
laration encourages the Court of Claims on remand to greatly
expand current regulatory takings law by finding a violation of the
Takings Clause.
Although the Federal Circuit instructed the Court of Claims to
use the proper test (the flexible balancing approach mandated by
the Supreme Court), the Federal Circuit, in implicitly supporting the
finding of a compensable partial taking, ignores the potential nega-
tive consequences of such a result.' In addition, the appellate
court encourages expansion of Supreme Court precedent in a man-
ner that the Supreme Court has refused to clearly support. Despite
the fact that the Court has remarked in dicta that it is possible for a
landowner "whose deprivation is one step short of complete"' 2' to
recover depending upon the weighing of balancing test factors,"2 it
has not granted certiorari in a case with a factual situation requiring
it to decide the partial takings question.1" Given that the Supreme
Court opened the door in Lucas dicta to the finding of a partial
taking, the Federal Circuit is justified in addressing the issue. As the
court observed, "Nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment
compels a court to find a taking only when the Government divests
the total ownership of the property."' 24 Yet the Federal Circuit is
not correct in encouraging the Court of Claims to find a partial tak-
ing where a property owner has been deprived of only sixty percent
of the fair market value of its property and where the landowner
will receive a reasonable return on its investment. If the Court of
117. See supra text accompanying notes 76 and 77.
118. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1567.
119. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
120. See infra part IV.B.
121. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886. 2895 n.8 (1992).
122. Id.
123. See eg., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Because the regulation in Lucas deprived the landowner of all economically viable
use of his property, it was not necessary for the Court to apply the balancing test and
determine the percentage of diminution in value that requires compensation. Id. at
2896 n.9. The Court merely applied an "all-or-nothing" categorical rule. Id. at 2893.
See also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) (denying certiorari where the record indicates a
60% diminution in value).
124. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1568.
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Claims finds that the permit denial has effected a taking and the
Federal Circuit affirms this decision, as it hints that it will do, the
Federal Circuit will have set a dangerous precedent that may result
in further unrestrained, and potentially imprudent, judicial decision-
making.
In explaining its decision to compensate property owners for par-
tial regulatory takings, the Federal Circuit rationalized that there is
no difference between a taking by physical invasion, which is com-
pensable regardless of its dimension, and a regulatory taking.
Logically, the amount of just compensation should be propor-
tional to the value of the interest taken as compared to the
total value of the property, up to and including total depriva-
tion, whether the taking is by physical occupation for the pub-
lic to use a park, or by regulatory imposition to preserve the
property as a wetland so that it may be used by the public for
ground water recharge and other ecological purposes.1 25
While Supreme Court Justices have disagreed as to whether regula-
tory takings cases should be distinguished from physical invasion
cases, 126 the Court has not held that the two governmental actions
require equal treatment. Physical invasion of private property by
the government infringes upon rights of the landowner that are not
affected by regulatory restrictions. "To the extent that the govern-
ment permanently occupies physical property, it effectively de-
stroys"'127 the rights of the owner to possess, use, and dispose of the
property. More important, physical occupation denies the owner
the right to exclude, "one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights., 121 The failure of the Federal
Circuit in Florida Rock IV to distinguish between physical invasion
and regulatory cases allows the court to justify its novel partial tak-
ings doctrine and send Fifth Amendment jurisprudence plunging
down an unguided path. The court's decision may significantly im-
pair, or even destroy, environmental laws and land use regulations
125. Id. at 1569. Although the court explicitly states that physical invasion and
regulatory cases should be treated alike, its decision indicates a different view. If
both types of cases were treated equally, then Florida Rock would be entitled to
compensation as long as the permit denial diminished the value of the property by
even the slightest extent, as is true in physical invasion cases. Yet in refusing to hold
that Florida Rock has suffered a taking, the court is actually acknowledging that not
all diminutions caused by regulatory action are entitled to compensation. The court
questions whether a 60 percent diminution is sufficient to constitute a taking and
instructs that this question be answered based upon other factors in the balancing
equation. Thus the court is actually stating that physical invasion cases, which utilize
a categorical rule, and regulatory cases, which use a balancing test in most situations,
should not be treated alike.
126. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 5A.20, at 173-74.




that have been implemented to protect the public health, safety, and
general welfare.
The United States Supreme Court has crafted takings precedent
carefully so as to balance competing interests. Although this balanc-
ing has succeeded in allowing regulatory measures to be enacted
that achieve legitimate governmental purposes, the balance is
flawed. When courts use categorical and inflexible rules to hold
noncompensable regulatory actions that seriously affect the value of
private property, they create a sense in the public of fundamental
unfairness and a distrust of all regulatory measures. This causes
courts like that in Florida Rock IV to attempt to legislate a remedy
judicially. These reactionary, short-sighted attempts alleviate the
problem at hand but create problems of an even greater magnitude.
They drastically tip the scales in favor of private property rights to
the detriment of the public good.
Flaws in the judicial balancing approach to regulatory takings
should be confronted by Congress. Informed, well-drafted legisla-
tion based on competent research will provide guidance to courts
and thereby increase uniformity and predictability in judicial deci-
sion-making. It will provide notice to property owners and to draft-
ers of future regulatory safeguards. Inequitable regulatory takings
decisions can be addressed by adopting partial takings legislation
that respects both the rights of individual private property owners
and the goals of environmental and land use laws and regulations.
B. Current Takings Legislation
No current federal statute deals with regulatory takings. Takings
law is crafted judicially. It has been argued that judge-made takings
law leads to unpredictable and conflicting results. 129 It also has
been argued that the results are in fact predictable but unfair.
Under current law the federal government through regulatory ac-
tion may diminish the economic value of private property by as
much as ninety-nine percent and not be obligated to compensate the
owner.1 30 In an effort to address this problem and bypass decades
of court rulings,13 1 the United States House of Representatives
passed the Private Property Protection Act of 1995132 on March 3,
129. Bill Vail, Proposed State Bill Addresses Property Rights, Just Compensation.
NEw ENG. AGRIC., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 7.
130. Id. Most courts do not require compensation unless government action
"render[s] the property virtually worthless." Property Rights: Bill Amended in
House; Costs Debated, Greenwire, Mar. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental
Law Library, Current News File (quoting Brigid Schulte, PHILA. INOUIRER).
131. Scott Allen, "Contract" Reframes Issue of Environment's Worth, BosToN
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1995, (Science & Technology), at 25.
132. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House passed a version of H.R.




1995. Among other things, the Act is an attempt to implement the
Republican "Contract with America"'133 by creating a statutory in-
terpretation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.134
The House passed the Private Property Protection Act by a vote
of 277 to 148.135 The legislation then was incorporated as Title IX
into the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, which
the House passed 277 to 141.136 Title IX greatly expands the judicial
definition of "regulatory taking."'1 3 7 It allows property owners to
seek compensation from the federal government where agency ac-
tion taken pursuant to specified federal laws and regulations reduces
property values by twenty percent or more.13 8 If property values
are reduced by fifty percent or greater, landowners may require the
federal government to purchase the property.' 3 9 Although an ear-
lier version of the bill encompassed all federal agency action, Re-
publican leaders narrowed the scope to placate moderate members
of the party who feared the potential costs of the broader draft. 140
The legislation as passed applies only to federal farm bills, select
Western water rights regulations, the Endangered Species Act, and
the wetlands provisions of the Clean Water Act.'4 ' Endangered
species and wetlands regulations were targeted because the House
Judiciary Committee believed these measures to be the most prob-
lematic' 42 "prompt[ing] the most angry complaints from property
133. The "Contract with America" is a legislative agenda designed by the new
Republican majority for the congressional session beginning in January 1995. The
objective of the plan is "to make the regulatory burden [of governmental agencies] a
matter of conscious choice rather than of accident." John H. Cushman Jr., Republi-
cans Plan Sweeping Barriers to New U.S. Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1994, § 1, at I
(quoting Random HousefTimes Books tract on the "Contract with America").
134. Property Rights: Bill Amended in House; Costs Debated, supra note 130.
135. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, Greenwire, Mar. 6,
1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library, Current News File.
136. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Two hundred nineteen Republicans
voted for the Act, eight voted against. Fifty-eight Democrats supported the Act, 132
opposed. The Act was sponsored by 131 Republicans and four Democrats. Id.
137. Tom Kenworthy, House Republicans Push Property-Owner Compensation
Bill Toward Vote, WASH. Posr, Mar. 3, 1995, at A7.
138. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135. Origi-
nally the Republicans supported a 10% threshold. This was abandoned as politically
unfeasible and impractical. H. Jane Lehman, Property Rights Fight Heats Up on
Hill; Environmental Concerns, Reimbursement Costs at Center of Debates, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 18, 1995, at Fl.
139. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135 (citing
Tom Kenworthy of WASH. POST).
140. Kenworthy, supra note 137, at A7.
141. Melissa Healy, House Approves Bill to Give Landowners Relief; Regulations:
People Would be Paid if Environmental Laws Hurt Property Values. Plan Faces Un-
certainty in Senate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at Al.
142. Property Proposal Revised, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1995, at A8.
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owners."' 4 3  Republicans rejected a Democratic amendment that
would have limited the legislation to new regulations. ' " Rebuffing
Supreme Court precedent, 4 ' the House bill allows property owners
to seek compensation where only a portion of the property is af-
fected by the regulation." 6 The bill has been called "one of the
most divisive elements of the GOP 'Contract with America' "47 and
likely will face opposition 1" and revision14 in the Senate.1 50 The
Clinton Administration, a strong supporter of private property
rights, has voiced its opposition to the takings legislation.'
Supporters of the House bill argue that existing federal regulatory
measures are excessive, severely hampering business growth"y and
infringing upon private property rights. 53 House Majority Whip
Thomas DeLay, a Republican from Texas, explained, "We want to
make sure that American small business and the American taxpayer
don't become the next endangered species. 's 4 Supporters urge that
legislation is needed to diminish the role of government155 and in-
143. Property Rights: House Panel OKs Bill; Trouble on Floor?, Greenwire, Feb.
17, 1995, available in LEXIS. Environmental Law Library, Current News File.
144. ld.
145. See supra text accompanying note 45.
146. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135.
147. Ken Miller, "Takings" Bills Called Liberation from Regulations. Gannett
News Service, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library. Cur-
rent News File.
148. Healy, supra note 141, at Al.
149. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135.
150. The takings legislation benefitted from Democratic support in the House yet
Senate Democrats may not be as cooperative. Healy. supra note 141, at Al. Sena-
tor John H. Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island and chairman of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, described the House bill as "a prescrip-
tion for gridlock and a regulatory straitjacket," predicting that the Senate's version
would not be as drastic as that of the House. l
151. Lehman, supra note 138, at Fl.
152. Supporters stress the urgency of reform by arguing that businesses will be
forced to close if the federal government does not start compensating property own-
ers for regulatory takings. Property Rights: Bill Amended in House; Costs Debated.
supra note 130.
153. Harold Gilliam, Does Anybody Care About the Environment Anymore?,
S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 5, 1995, at ZI. See also Former Senators Blast House Regula-
tory Bill, Reuters North American Vire, Feb. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environ-
mental Law Library, Current News File (takings bill is needed "to curb federal
regulatory excesses, which ... stymie business growth and infringe on private prop-
erty rights"); Miller, supra note 147 ("Farmers. ranchers and ... water-users, live
with the constant fear that a single stroke of the bureaucratic pen could devastate
the use and value of their property . ) (quoting Republican Representative
Wayne Allard of Colorado).
154. Allen, supra note 131, (Science & Technology) at 25.




crease regulatory accountability.' 56 Noted one House Republican,
it is time to "restore the power of the people .. .,."' Advocates of
the bill downplay its novelty by asserting that the Constitution has
long protected private property rights by requiring compensation
for governmental takings.15  They stress that the convenience af-
forded by avoiding the compensation requirement is not a sufficient
reason to justify uncompensated taking of land15 9 and that the costs
of the bill will not be as great as opponents say because the legisla-
tion will deter future regulatory action that restricts the use of pri-
vate property.' 60  Supporters also assert a "fairness" argument.
They emphasize that individuals should not be forced to bear the
burden of regulatory actions that benefit society as a whole.161
Republicans have encouraged support for the takings legislation
by asserting that it is the result of a strong "grassroots" move-
ment 62 and a "response to the growing frustration of small and
large property owners with land use restrictions stemming from con-
156. National Association of Home Builders President Jim Irvine notes that
"[fior the first time in decades, government bureaucrats will now be held accounta-
ble when they deny an individual the use of his property." Regulation: "Takings"
Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135.
157. Scott Allen, Gore Blasts GOP on Environmental Issues; House Bills on Reg-
ulation are Derided, BosTrON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1995, (National/Foreign), at 5 (quoting
Representative Richard Pombo from California).
158. Property Rights: How's It Playing?; Opinion Writers Split, Greenwire, Mar.
7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library, Current News File ("Prop-
erty rights are protected by the US Constitution.") (quoting BOsTON HERALD). See
also Property Rights: How's It Playing? 4 of 5 Oppose Bill, Greenwire, Mar. 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library, Current News File ("There's noth-
ing novel about the concept of takings compensation. The Bill of Rights, specifically
the Fifth Amendment, requires it.") (quoting WASH. TimES).
159. Property Rights: How's It Playing?; Opinion Writers Split, supra note 158("Constitutional rights may not be disregarded for convenience.") (quoting BOSTON
HERALD).
160. Property Rights: Bill Amended in House; Costs Debated, supra note 130. See
also Miller, supra note 147 (Takings legislation "'won't cost the government one
dime' as long as it stops attacking the rights of property owners.") (quoting Repre-
sentative W. J. "Billy" Tauzin, a Democrat from Louisiana).
161. The American Legislative Exchange Council argues that "[e]nvironmental
protection benefits society; therefore, society should bear the costs" and that "[i]t is
inequitable for government to shift the cost of environmental protection to a small
number of private property owners who are coerced into 'donating' their assets...
to the public without just compensation." Jennifer Mears, Road to Property Rights is
Often Full of Bumps; Timber: No State Has Approved a Broad Formula for Compen-
sating Landowners for Seized Land. In Mississippi a Landowner Must be Compen-
sated if Acreage is Devalued by 40% or More by Forestry Regulations, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1995, at B3. See also Allen, supra note 131, (Science & Technology) at 25("If the public believes it is a valuable resource, then the public should be willing to
step up and make a contribution.") (quoting Margaret Ann Reigle, chairwoman of
the Fairness to Land Owners Committee).
162. Curbs on Environment Rules Gain, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1995, (News), at 6.
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servation laws that seek to protect wetlands and wildlife." ' I Ac-
cording to one observer, the increasing number of environmental
regulations is the impetus for the current property rights movement,
which began in the mid-1980s' 6 and now consists of as many as 600
property rights groups nationwide.1t 5 Yet Republican supporters of
the bill have been criticized for misrepresenting the actual support-
ers and beneficiaries of takings legislation. Many groups in the pow-
erful property rights movement are supported not by small
landowners but by agricultural and industrial trade associations, lob-
byists for large energy, mining, and timber companies, and con-
servative public interest law firms." Opponents of the bill argue
that business and special interest groups are the actual beneficiaries
of takings legislation 67 and that "the intellectual fodder of this
movement, a host of anecdotes featuring 'the poor American in pur-
suit of the American Dream who now finds that a heartless bureau-
crat has appropriated his hard-earned property to save the habitat
of the tawny grubcatcher,' is completely manufactured."' 61 Not
only have special interest groups affected federal takings legislation,
but they also have had a significant impact on takings reform in
state legislatures. 69
163. Kenworthy, supra note 137, at A7.
164. Mears, supra note 161, at B3.
165. Property Rights: N.Y. Tunes Profiles the Movement, Greenvire, Jan. 9, 1995.
available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library, Current News File (citing Keith
Schneider of N.Y. TIMEs).
166. ld. See also Andre Carothers, Don't Beat the Retreat; Environmentalism.
Information Access Co., Feb. 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library.
Current News File ("An anti-environmental backlash has indeed appeared, but it is
orchestrated not by the common folk but by corporations, conservative think-tanks
and their well-heeled allies in Congress.").
167. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135 (-The
Republican Party is still very closely tied to business, and in these measures...
business is getting its payoff.") (quoting Alan Murray of WALL ST. J.); ("The Con-
gress has passed anti-environmental bills before, but never before has it been so
clear that a House of Congress is completely controlled by the special interests that
pollute America.") (quoting Carl Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club).
168. Carothers, supra note 166.
169. Id. ("[A]Imost all of the 'takings' bills that have been proposed in state
legislatures around the country are written by a little right-wing think tank. the
American Legislative Exchange Council, funded by the usual long-lived cast of con-
servative businesses and private foundations.").
State legislators are currently introducing or debating property rights legislation in
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland. Mis-
sissippi, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. Property Rights I: Many States Considering Takings
Bills, Greenwire, Jan. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law Library.
Current News File (citing National Audubon Society release, Jan. 12, 1995).
As many as seven takings reform bills will be introduced in the Maine Legislature
during the 1995 session. Andrew K. Weegar, Take This Law and Dismantle It, ME.
TimEs, Feb. 17, 1995, at 14. One bill, introduced by State Senator Dana Hanley. a
Republican from Oxford, requires compensation where state or local governmental
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Opponents of the House bill criticize the measure as an "ex-
treme,' 170 back-handed,'171 and "transparent" 172 attempt to destroy
environmental standards under the guise of protecting private prop-
erty rights. 173 They stress that the new Republican majority prom-
ised to enact its legislative agenda within the first one hundred days
of the 1995 congressional session and that "[t]here is little evidence
that in its 100-day rush to the deadline, Congress has pondered
deeply the implications of its decrees.' 174 Critics charge that the
legislation will undermine public health and safety by forcing the
federal government to stop enforcing environmental laws and regu-
lations encompassed by the bill175 and by deterring the passage of
new environmental measures.176 Edmund Muskie, a former chair-
man of the Senate Environmental Pollution subcommittee, re-
marked that the bill "would halt 25 years of accomplishment and
turn the clock back to the days when the special interests made the
rules and the people absorbed the risks."' 77 Critics of the bill stress
that the failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations will
result in uncontrolled development that will harm neighboring land-
owners17 8 and have a potentially massive financial impact.7179
To avoid the consequences of uncontrolled development, the gov-
ernment could continue to implement and enforce environmental
regulations. Yet the costs of enforcement could be as staggering as
regulation decreases the fair market value of private property by more than 50% of
its preregulatory fair market value. L.D. 170, § 843 (117th Legis. 1995). Opponents
have criticized the bill and other takings legislation as "'a solution in search of a
problem .... ' " Weegar, supra, at 14.
170. Allen, supra note 157, (National/Foreign), at 5 (takings bill and other bills
aimed at deregulation "are extreme measures that would make the problems they
purport to address even worse") (quoting Vice President Al Gore).
171. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135 (EPA
Administrator Carol Browner described the Republican bill as a "back-door effort
to dismantle public health protection.").
172. Id. (An Environmental Defense Fund attorney criticized the bill as "a trans-
parent effort to gut environmental standards at great cost to taxpayers.").
173. Pesce, supra note 155, at 3A (Supporters of takings legislation are "'using
the property rights issue to gut environmental laws ... ) (quoting a member of
the environmental group Clean Water Action).
174. Gilliam, supra note 153, at Z1.
175. Healy, supra note 141, at Al ("Environmental groups warn[ ] that the tak-
ings bill ... [will] cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year or [will] force the
federal government to effectively stop enforcing key environmental laws.").
176. Id. ("The effect of the new legislation [will] be to halt many regulations at
their inception .... ) (quoting Representative Christopher Cox, chairman of the
House Republican Policy Committee).
177. Former Senators Blast House Regulatory Bill, supra note 153.
178. Lehman, supra note 138, at Fl.
179. Property Rights: How's It Playing?; Opinion Writers Split, supra note 158
("(The takings bill) would drain billions of dollars from the fteasury, chill efforts to
protect endangered species and hurt pollution control, while ignoring the huge pub-
lic costs of uncontrolled development.") (quoting MILWAUKEE J.).
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the costs of uncontrolled development."'0 In 1994 the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated it would cost the federal government
$10 billion to $45 billion per year to compensate landowners whose
property value was affected by the wetlands protection program.18'
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt estimated that the bill could cost
the Interior Department over $7.6 billion dollars, its current annual
budget. 2 One of the major problems with the takings bill is that no
one knows what the new entitlement program will cost, although the
Clinton administration gave a preliminary estimate of several bil-
lions of dollars.' 3
Opponents not only have focused on the environmental and eco-
nomic impact of the legislation but also on other adverse conse-
quences. They argue that it will be a "bonanza for trial lawyers," 1" 4
encouraging endless litigation seeking compensation." It also will
encourage speculative land purchasing. 16 The beneficiaries of the
bill will not be small property owners but "wealthy corporate devel-
opers,"'" thus assisting the few at the expense of the many. t s  Op-
ponents argue that the property rights movement has lost sight of
the fact that environmental regulations benefit the public as a
whole"8 and often increase the value of individuals' property."''
Senator John H. Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island and
180. Critics of the bill contend that it will not deter implementation of future
regulation. See id. ("If there were some reason to believe that bureaucrats would be
deterred by the potential cost of their meddling, that would be a point in favor of the
GOP bill. But what deterrent is there when taxpayers have to pick up the tab for
unnecessary regulation?") (quoting GREENSBORO (N.C.) NEWS & RECORD).
181. Healy, supra note 141, at Al.
182. Property Rights: Bill Amended in House; Costs Debated, supra note 130.
183. Kenworthy, supra note 137, at A7.
184. Miller, supra note 147 (quoting Richard Codd of the American Planning
Ass'n).
185. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135 ("At a
minimum, this will bring on endless litigation seeking compensation.") (quoting Hal
Candee, an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council).
186. Georgetown University law professor J. Peter Byrne called the bill "pro-
foundly stupid." David G. Savage, Administration Blasts Plan to Compensate Land-
owners; Regulation: House GOP Proposal to Pay for Devalued Property is Called
"Stupid." Advocates Say It's Needed to Ease Heavy-Handed Federal Rules. LA.
TimEs, Feb. 11, 1995, at A13. "If the bill becomes law, tongue in cheek, Byrne said
he will 'buy a wetland on Virginia's eastern shore, request a permit to ill it, get
potentially massive compensation under H.R. 9. . ., pay off my mortgage and have
enough left to build a house on dry land.'" Id.
187. Allen, supra note 157, (National/Foreign), at 5 (quoting Vice President Al
Gore).
188. Pesce, supra note 155, at 3A (citing Lisa Guide, spokeswoman at the U.S.
Interior Department).
189. Mears, supra note 161, at B3.
190. Representative Sam Farr, a Democrat from California and owner of coastal
property, observed that property values have risen as result of governmental restric-
tions. Miller, supra note 147.
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chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, urged
that "[t]he most important thing to keep in mind is that a major
purpose behind much of our environmental law is to protect private
property rights .... These laws protect our health, life and property
from the adverse consequences of somebody else's pollution and
other nuisances imposed on us by our neighbors as they pursue their
own interests."'' Criticism of the Republican proposal also con-
demns its lack of common sense, for the bill ultimately "compen-
sate[s] property owners for obeying the laws on public health and
safety."' 9 The legislation also encourages an egoistic and short-
sighted attitude: "If I can't do exactly what I want with my prop-
erty, no matter who I hurt, the taxpayers have to pay me.' '1 3
Richard Epstein, a "guru of the property rights movement,"' 94 ob-
serves that "[t]he danger is 'a tendency (for the public) to get so
upset about the government that you think private ownership means
unlimited use of land.' "95 Lastly, opponents emphasize that the
takings measure will "sweep away years of constitutional law"' 96 by
"replac[ing] the constitutional standards of fairness and justice with
a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach that focuses on the extent to which
regulations affect property value."1t 9 7
The balancing test of the Supreme Court rejects a "one-size-fits-
all" approach. This does not mean that a bright line, legislatively-
mandated method of determining when a regulatory taking occurs is
necessarily detrimental to environmental and land use safeguards.
Bright line legislation must be tailored to allow courts to consider
the varying circumstances in particular cases. It must also address
the actual problem without creating additional adverse repercus-
sions. Thus, in drafting regulatory takings legislation, one must first
determine the extent of the current law's negative consequences.
Private property owners, small and large, have suffered from federal
regulatory measures that substantially diminish the economic value
of their property yet fail to meet the "all-or-nothing" Lucas test.
This fact must be acknowledged by opponents of takings reform if a
satisfactory solution is to be found. On the other hand, supporters
191. Ken Miller, Senate Environmental Chairman Cool to Gutting Protective
Laws, Gannett News Service, Jan. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environmental Law
Library, Current News File.
192. Gilliam, supra note 153, at ZI (quoting Sierra Club President Robert Cox).
See also Kenworthy, supra note 137, at A7 (The legislation will force taxpayers "to
pay landowners not to pollute or degrade public resources.") (quoting Representa-
tive Elizabeth Furse, a Democrat from Oregon).
193. Healy, supra note 141, at Al (quoting Pam Goddard of the Sierra Club).
194. Pesce, supra note 155, at 3A.
195. Id.
196. Regulation: "Takings" Bill Passes; Reactions Pour In, supra note 135 (quot-
ing EPA Administrator Carol Browner).




must recognize that the number of individual landowners suffering
under federal regulations is not as vast as property rights groups
maintain. More than ninety-eight percent of the permits requested
to fill in or move wetlands are granted under the Clean Water Act,
and the Fish and Wildlife Service prohibits development proposals
in only a tenth of one percent of its 10,000 annual reviews under the
Endangered Species Act.198 The Lucas test should be expanded to
aid property owners who experience extreme diminution in value
because of federal regulation. This does not mean that every land-
owner who is affected financially by an environmental law or land
use ordinance should be compensated. Supporters of takings legis-
lation have a legitimate complaint where individuals are harmed
substantially, yet a solution requiring compensation where property
values are decreased by twenty percent or more is "dramatic
overkill."'199 The Supreme Court has adopted an approach that
strives to balance the public interest and individual property rights.
Congress should respect the wisdom of this approach in formulating
legislation that will help those who deserve protection but have
failed to meet the Court's standards. Congress must recognize that
private property rights, although protected by the Fifth
Amendment,
have always been understood to exist in a balance with the
rights of neighbors and the community at large-the "com-
mon good." That balance limits what one can do with private
property to ensure that it does not harm broader public rights
to health, safety and public resources such as clean air and
water.20
0
The takings bill passed by the House of Representatives abolishes
this balance.
C. Recommendations for Takings Legislation
A modified, bright line legislative approach to the regulatory tak-
ings issue can balance competing interests while simultaneously
solving the problem when a property owner, who in fairness should
be compensated, is not because of current judicially-crafted takings
law. The House bill requires compensation at twenty percent or
greater diminution in value. This is determined by examining the
portion of the property affected by the regulation and not by exam-
ining the entire parcel as the present status of the law requires.20'
The Republican proposal should be replaced with legislation creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption that compensation is due where a
198. Carothers, supra note 166.
199. Allen, supra note 131, (Science & Technology) at 25 (quoting EPA Adminis-
trator Carol Browner).
200. The GOP Contract on the Environment, S.F. CHRON.. Jan. 3, 1995. at A16.
201. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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specified federal regulation decreases the fair market value of an
entire parcel by more than eighty percent or a similarly significant
percentage. Once a property owner shows that the value of his
property has been reduced by the requisite amount, he will have
met his prima facie burden. The burden then shifts to the govern-
ment to rebut the presumption that the regulation effects a taking.
To meet its burden the government must prove that the applicability
of one or more legislatively-outlined factors justifies a denial of the
takings challenge. In determining which factors to include in a tak-
ings reform bill and how to set priorities for those factors, Congress
should consider and clarify the elements used by the Supreme Court
in its balancing test.
Reasonable investment-backed expectations and the necessity of
the regulatory control are two factors that should be of utmost im-
portance in determining whether the government has met its bur-
den. To rebut the presumption of a taking, the government should
be required to show that the post-regulation value of the property
represents a "reasonable" return in comparison to the purchase
price of the parcel, thus satisfying the property owner's investment-
backed expectations." Legislation should require courts in exam-
ining such expectations to consider whether the property in question
is part of a multi-stage development and if so, whether the property
owner has received a reasonable return in earlier stages. A takings
act also should mandate that courts determine whether the regula-
tion involves a transferrable development rights program and if so,
whether the program provides, or helps to provide, a reasonable re-
turn to the property owner.
A second factor that should be included in takings legislation is
consideration of the purpose and necessity of the regulatory control.
Where the objective of the regulation is purely aesthetic, the gov-
ernment should have more difficulty rebutting the presumption of a
taking than where the goal of the restriction is public health or
safety. Congress should enumerate and assign priorities to broad
202. For example, if a landowner purchases property for $1000 per acre, the pre-
regulation fair market value of the parcel is $3500 per acre, and the post-regulation
fair market value is $500 per acre, the landowner meets his prima facie burden be-
cause the reduction in value from pre-regulation to post-regulation is greater than
80%. The government, however, does not meet its burden regarding the invest-
ment-backed expectations factor because the landowner, who purchased property
for $1000 per acre and is left with property worth $500 per acre, does not receive a
"reasonable" return on his investment. The government would meet its burden
where the property owner purchases a parcel for $100 per acre and the pre-regula-
tion and post-regulation fair market values are $3500 and $500 per acre, respec-
tively. Again, the landowner meets his prima facie burden because the regulation
reduces the fair market value of the property by more than 80%. Yet in this situa-
tion the government also meets its burden because the landowner purchased the
property for $100 per acre but is able to sell the land for $500 per acre, thus receiv-
ing a very "reasonable" return of 400%.
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legislative objectives to provide guidance to courts examining the
necessity of the governmental control. A legislative enactment also
should include an exception where the regulation as implemented
precludes a land use that is prohibited by a state's law of property or
nuisance.20 3 If the use is precluded by state law, compensation
should not be required, regardless of the diminution in value caused
by the regulation.2°4 Both the necessity of the regulatory control
and the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the property
owner are important factors that should be addressed in takings re-
form legislation to define whether the government has gone "too
far."
By raising the requisite diminution in value percentage and by
incorporating a rebuttable presumption into legislation, Congress
will clarify current regulatory takings law without destroying envi-
ronmental laws and land use regulations. Such legislation also will
address the concern that deserving landowners presently are not be-
ing compensated under the Supreme Court's balancing test. By de-
veloping and mandating the use of factors that allow the
government to rebut the presumption of a taking, Congress will
maintain the fact-specific inquiry currently followed by the courts
205
while encouraging consistency in judicial decision making. Fact-spe-
cific analyses allow the judiciary to examine and respond to the
unique circumstances of each case, thereby increasing the likelihood
of decisions perceived to be fair. A comparison between the bright
line, twenty percent legislation passed by the House of Representa-
tives and the modified, eighty percent legislation demonstrates that
the latter approach will achieve a more equitable result. Under the
House bill Florida Rock is entitled to compensation from a govern-
ment already burdened with a budget deficit. The legislation re-
quires that the effect of the Clean Water Act on the value of Florida
Rock's property be viewed as a taking, notwithstanding the fact that
Florida Rock will receive more than a reasonable return on its in-
vestment. Under the recommended legislation Florida Rock is not
entitled to compensation, but the most deserving property owners
203. The Supreme Court in Lucas established a "nuisance exception" to its cate-
gorical rule, requiring compensation where governmental action deprives a land-
owner of all economically viable use of his land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land ...
must . . . do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners ... under the State's law
of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Id.
204. The takings reform bill passed by the United States House of Representa-
tives includes a similar, although overly restrictive, exception. H.R. 9. 104th Cong..
1st Sess. (1995).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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would be afforded reasonable relief pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Florida Rock /V 0 6 and the takings legislation recently passed by the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress 207 balance
the interests of private property owners with those of society and
drastically tip the scales in favor of individual landholders at the
community's expense. The Supreme Court and lower federal and
state courts repeatedly have expounded that an individual private
property owner should not be forced to bear a burden that should
be borne by all.20 8 Yet this does not mean that an individual has a
right to use his property in any manner he pleases. 209 Government
cannot protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens
without affecting the value of private property and landowners'
rights in general.210
The court in Florida Rock IV recognized that under existing judi-
cially-created takings law, some property owners are denied com-
pensation who should, "in all fairness,"21' recover their financial
losses. The Federal Circuit encouraged the Court of Claims to find
on remand that a regulatory taking had occurred where enforce-
ment of the wetlands provisions of the Clean Water Act diminished
the value of Florida Rock's property by approximately sixty percent.
Such a finding would represent a drastic expansion of Supreme
Court precedent and demonstrate a short-sighted reaction that
could lead to endless litigation at great cost to the federal govern-
ment and the taxpayers. Before other courts follow the lead of the
Federal Circuit, Congress should act to mandate legislatively com-
pensation in extreme situations that do not currently meet the "all-
or-nothing" Lucas approach of the Supreme Court. Such legislation
must be crafted carefully to balance the interests of landowners with
those of the public good without creating a massive entitlement pro-
gram that jeopardizes decades of environmental and land use safe-
206. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
207. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
208. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 n.4
(1987) ("One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' ") (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
209. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
210. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Govern-
ment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.").
211. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 836 (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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guards that have benefitted, and should continue to benefit, society
and its individual members.
Susan E. Spokes

